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Abstract: This paper studies the theoretical effects of changes in disaster risk on macroeconomic
variables in five Latin American economies. It compares country-specific variants of the New
Keynesian model with disaster risk developed by Isoré and Szczerbowicz (2017). Countries with
higher price flexibility, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, are found to be relatively less vulnerable
to disaster risk shocks, as compared to Chile and Colombia in particular. Overall, the analysis suggests
that increases in the probability of natural disasters over time may have significant macroeconomic
effects, beyond the direct impact of actual disaster occurrences themselves.
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1. Introduction
Evidence regarding the macroeconomic effects of natural disasters is scarce and not yet conclusive.
In particular, it seems that natural events need to be “extreme” to significantly impact a country’s
short or long term GDP growth (Cavallo et al. 2013). The most commonly used database of natural
disasters, EM-DAT (www.emdat.be) includes a very large range of situations that “overwhelms local
capacity and/or necessitates a request for external assistance”, from floods to earthquakes among
many others. Yet, what may look like a catastrophe at the local level does not necessarily matter
at aggregate levels, unless the geographical size of the country is itself very small, such as Haiti,
for instance (Cavallo et al. 2010). Therefore, while negative effects are found on specific samples or
disaster types (e.g., Hsiang and Jina (2014) for cyclones), no significant impact emerge in meta-analyses
of indirect costs (Lazzaroni and van Bergeijk 2014).2 Skidmore and Toya (2002) even argue that
natural disasters may even have a positive long run growth effect via the reconstruction activities
in the recovery phase. From a theoretical point of view, the impact of disasters on growth is also
ambiguous. Standard growth model would predict that a sudden destruction of the physical capital
stock increases output growth by stimulating savings and investment. On the contrary, endogenous
growth models with increasing returns to scale may find negative effects. Hence, the consequences of
actual natural disasters on dynamic macroeconomic variables are far from clear-cut, both theoretically
and empirically.
Meanwhile, a recent but growing macroeconomic literature has emphasized the role of disaster
risk on economic outcomes, starting with the seminal paper by Barro (2006). Originally designed
for replicating asset pricing features, such as the risk premium puzzle, this literature has been
1 The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of Finland.
2 Caruso and Miller (2015) and Caruso (2017) argue that other long run welfare consequences exist, such as negative health
effects, impacts on labor markets, and losses of human capital accumulation, even without clear effects in terms of growth.
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further developed into dynamic and stochastic macroeconomic models. Gabaix (2011), Gabaix (2012),
and Gourio (2012) have introduced a small but time-varying probability of disasters in real business
cycle models, and find that changes in the probability of disasters, without any arrival of the disaster
itself, may suffice to trigger economic recessions. Isoré and Szczerbowicz (2017) further showed how to
extend this approach to a New Keynesian environment, and found that disaster risk shocksn—again,
absent of actual disaster realization—, generate procyclical responses of consumption, investment,
labor, wage, and inflation, simultaneously to the recession and rise in equity premium. Further
empirical evidence by Siriwardane (2015) and Marfè and Penasse (2017) support the relationship
between changes in the probability of a disaster and macroeconomic variables.
It may seem like a paradox that changes in disaster risk affect real macroeconomic variables when
natural disasters themselves generally do not. The disaster risk literature defines “disasters” as rare
events destroying a large share of a country’s existing capital stock. Even though it often focuses on
political or financial disasters, it also encompasses extreme natural events, by definition. Therefore,
this suggests that it is not so much the arrival of actual natural disasters that affects the dynamic paths
of macroeconomic variables, but the simple risk that they may occur, i.e the uncertainty component
that is embedded in changes in their probability over time.
In this paper, changes in disaster risk are simulated for five Latin American countries—namely
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico—using variants from the New Keynesian DSGE
model developed by Isoré and Szczerbowicz (2017). This study is the first analysis of the effects of
changes in disaster risk, absent of actual disaster occurrence, in the particular context of emerging
economies. Here are the main results. In all five countries, a 1% increase in the probability of disaster
unambiguously decrease output, consumption, investment, labor, wage, and inflation, on impact.
However, a large rebound in investment follows in the period after the shock in Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico. This tends to limit the size of the macroeconomic responses for this group of countries.
On the contrary, Chile and Colombia do not experience the rebound, exacerbating the magnitude and
persistence of the shock. The model gives theoretical explanations to these differences. In particular,
very low degrees of price stickiness make the first group of countries less vulnerable. As the probability
of a disaster increases, output prices adjust quickly, such that precautionary savings are channelled
quite rapidly into higher investment. On the contrary, with slightly less frequent—but still much more
than e.g., in the US—price changes, Chile and Colombia’s responses in production factors, capital
and labor, is much more pronounced, translating into much lower investment, and therefore output.
Higher frequency and severity of natural disasters, such as in Chile, where extreme events are mostly
earthquakes, also contribute to particularly strong macroeconomic responses to disaster uncertainty.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents some evidence on natural disasters
in the five countries of interest, regarding their frequency, type, and size in particular. Section 3
summarizes the model by Isoré and Szczerbowicz (2017), a New Keynesian DSGE model which
embeds a small but time-varying probability of disaster. Section 4 discusses how calibration accounts
for country specificities and shows the responses of macroeconomic variables to a 1% change in disaster
risk. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. Evidence on Natural Disasters in Latin America
The scope of this paper is limited to five countries, namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
and Mexico. This group of countries has several advantages. First, they are part of the broadly
defined range of emerging economies. Toya and Skidmore (2007) find that high income and financially
developed countries typically suffer less from natural disasters, partly because they may be located
in geographic regions with disasters of lower physical intensity but also because wealth makes them
less vulnerable to disasters of any given size (by larger investment in safety measures for instance).
Second, among emerging economies, these five countries are geographically large enough such that
any “local” natural disaster does not automatically slow down their economy, but only “extreme” ones
may. Third and most importantly, empirical evidence is sufficiently important for some of the model
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parameters required in the theoretical simulation exercises presented here. In particular, the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution and the degree of price stickiness play a key role in the responses, as explained
in Isoré and Szczerbowicz (2017). These parameters are well documented for this group of countries,
unlike for example South-Asian countries of similar income levels (see Subsection 4.1).
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution in the number of disasters over time for these five countries,
as reported in the EM-DAT database. The most striking feature—yet not limited to this particular group
of countries—is the growth of disaster occurrences over time. Low figures in the early period might
partly be explained by under-reporting. However, even over the 1990s onward period, the positive
trend remains. Reasons for this trend are beyond the scope of this paper, but climate change could be an
obvious candidate. As far as economic consequences of natural disasters are concerned, this suggests
that it might be worth investigating not only the impact of actual disaster occurrences per se, but also
changes in their frequency over time.
Figure 1. Number of natural disasters since 1960 for selected countries. Three-year moving average.
Source: EM-DAT and author’s calculations.
However, since only extreme events seem to matter for macroeconomic outcomes, both according
to empirical evidence on natural disasters and the theoretical disaster risk literature, the scope of these
events to be considered must be narrowed down from EM-DAT. Table A1 here reports only the first
top-10 natural disasters per country of interest, together with their type and associated capital loss in
current US dollar terms. The “∆” column od the same table calculates the share of the country-specific
capital stock which corresponds to this damage, using data on capital stock and deflator available from
1950 in FRED database (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/). Finally, the long-term probability of extreme
natural events is defined as the frequency of disasters with ∆ > 0.001, i.e., a destruction share of the
capital stock of at least 0.1%. Averaged across the five countries, this probability is 4.5% annually.
Nevertheless, heterogeneity across the five countries is substantial, partly due to the type of natural
disasters they face and other geographical features. For instance, Chile’s density of capital stock in
narrow geographical areas subject to earthquakes contributes to high capital damages.
Overall, these stylized facts first suggest that time variations in the probability of natural disasters
may matter for economic outcomes, beyond actual occurrences of these disasters. Second, they provide
information on the relative size of capital destruction in case of extreme natural disasters as well
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as their long-term probability, both dimensions being taken into consideration when simulating the
model responses of macroeconomic variables to disaster risk shocks in Section 4.
3. Model Overview
The economy is composed of households, firms, and a public authority. Calculation details are
provided in Isoré and Szczerbowicz (2017).
3.1. Households
Households are infinitely-lived and identical over a unit interval. Their lifetime utility is defined
as recursive Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences as
Ṽt =
[[












where C denotes consumption, L labor supply, 0 < β0 < 1 the discount factor, γ the parameter of risk
aversion, and 1/[1 − (1 + v)(1 − ψ)] the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS).
Households accumulate capital stock over time according to
Kt+1 =
[













convex capital adjustment costs,
and where x is an indicator variable standing for the arrival of a “disaster” that would destroy a
fraction ∆ of the capital stock.3
A disaster is an event associated with a (low) probability θt, in which case xt+1 = 1, and xt+1 = 0
otherwise. This probability θt is itself time-varying and follows a first-order autoregressive process as
log θt = (1 − ρθ) log θ̄ + ρθ log θt−1 + σθεθt (3)
where θ̄ is the mean, ρθ the persistence, and εθ i.i.d innovations.
Households not only consume and invest in capital but can also save in the form of one-periods
bonds issued by a public authority, and pay lump-sum taxes. They rent their capital and labor force to
monopolistic competition firms that they own. Therefore, their budget constraint is given by












where T denote the taxes, B the bonds with yield r, p the price of final goods, W the wage rate, Pkt the
rental rate of capital, and D dividends from the firms.
The problem of the representative household is therefore to maximize (1) subject to (2) and (4),
given the time-varying disaster risk (3). As such, this problems gives nonlinear optimality conditions
because of the potential occurrence of a (large) disaster, x. However, simple stationarity assumptions
can be made so as to reexpress these conditions in terms of the disaster risk, θt, only and not the
disaster event itself. Then, perturbation methods can be used to simulate the impact of a change in
disaster risk, instead of global methods had the disaster occurrence stayed in the equilibrium system.
This solution method is detailed in Isoré and Szczerbowicz (2017).
3 The depreciation rate is a function of the utilization rate u of capital as δt = δ0u
η
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3.2. Firms
The supply side of this economy is composed of a final good sector, in perfect competition, and j
intermediate goods sector, in monopolistic competition. Intermediate goods firms minimize their cost
of production in each period by choosing optimal labor and capital demand levels such that
min
Lj,t ,utKj,t






and Yj,t = (utKj,t)α(ztLj,t)1−α.
The first constraint is a downward-sloping demand curve for good j, with
pj,t
pt its relative price and









. The second constraint is a Cobb-Douglas production function
where zt is a labor-augmenting productivity which grows according to
zt+1
zt
= eµ+xt+1 ln(1−∆) (5)
where µ is a trend, while the second term accounts for the impact of disasters.4
In addition, with Calvo probability ζ, intermediate goods producers update their price in period t




























is the (real) households’ stochastic discount factor. The resulting price gives an optimal inflation rate as















Ξ2t = Yt + ζEt
[




with mc∗t the real marginal cost of production.
3.3. Public Authority
Finally, a public authority collects taxes, issues the bonds, and sets their nominal yield according
to a Taylor type rule as
rt = ρrrt−1 + (1 − ρr)
[










4 This assumption follows Gourio (2012) and its role is further discussed in Isoré and Szczerbowicz (2017).
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where an overbar stands for the steady-state value of a variable.
4. Simulations
After a brief description of calibration values in Subsection 4.1, a 1% increase in disaster risk is
simulated for the countries of interest, with two distinct exercises as follows. First, in Subsection 4.2,
only the EIS and price stickiness vary across countries, while everything else is kept identical across
countries. This allows to gauge the specific role of these parameters in driving the macroeconomic
responses. Then, in Subsection 4.3, also the size and long term probability of disasters differ across
countries. In that case, divergences across countries become even more striking.
4.1. Calibration
Table 1 presents the main calibration values. Most correspond to Isoré and Szczerbowicz (2017) at
monthly (instead of quarterly) frequency, and the reader can refer to that paper for a lengthier description.
However, four specific parameters are modified to account for country-specific characteristics, as follows.5
Table 1. Calibration, monthly values.
Disaster risk
θ̄ probability of disaster 0.0037
∆ size of disaster 0.0078
ρθ persistence of (log) disaster risk 0.965
σθ st. dev. of innovations to (log) disaster risk 0.2
Utility function
β0 discount factor 0.9976
γ risk aversion coefficient 3.8
v leisure preference 2.33







δ0 capital depreciation rate 0.0067
τ capital adjustment cost 2
ū steady-state utilization rate of capital 1
Production
α capital share of production 0.33
ν elasticity of substitution among goods 6
µ trend growth of productivity 0.0017







Φπ Taylor rule inflation weight 1.6
Φy Taylor rule output weight 0.4
π̄ target (gross) inflation rate 1.0017
ρr interest rate smoothing parameter 0.947
5 This does not mean that other parameters are not country-specific, but that their importance for the simulations of this particular
model is negligible, such keeping them identical across countries favor the ease of comparison.
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First, the EIS follows country-specific mean estimates by Havranek et al. (2015). Their methodology
has the advantage to make studies with different models and empirical strategies comparable. For our
five countries of interest, the mean EIS estimate is quite low, below 0.16 as compared to 0.6 for the US
for instance, and reported in Table 1.6 This observation is consistent with the idea that countries where
households hold less stock market assets exhibit lower EIS values, in line with the literature.
Second, degrees of price stickiness (Calvo probabilities) follow empirical estimates
by Burstein et al. (2005) for Argentina and by Morandé and Tejada (2008) for the four other countries.
All five countries are much more price-flexible than the US, where price change is observed every
7.5 months on average, but particularly so in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico with 1.5 to 1.7 month on
average versus 3.1 to 3.3 for Chile and Colombia. Gagnon (2009) documents that the frequency of price
change in Mexico has varied a lot between low-inflation and high-inflation regimes, but Morandé and
Tejada (2008)’s estimate for the period 1995–2006 seems consistent with this result.
Finally, the size of capital destruction in case of a disaster, ∆, and the steady-state probability of a
disaster, θ̄, are calculated as described earlier (Section 2). In Table 1 and the first simulation exercise
(Section 4.2), the results are averaged across the five countries, such that only the EIS and Calvo
probability differences are at play. Then, in the second simulation exercise (Section 4.3), they follow the
country-specific values reported in Table A1.
4.2. Response to a Disaster Risk Shock: Country-Specific EIS and Price Stickiness Only
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the effects of a 1% increase in the probability of disaster on the main
macroeconomic variables. The increase in disaster risk reduces investment and consumption, and thus
generates a recession, in all five countries of interest. As the demand for production factors drops,
labor and wages also go down. Lower consumption levels generate a deflation. However, the size of
these responses and the recovery period largely differ between the two groups. Indeed, Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico (Figure 2) experience an overall very small initial impact, on output and labor in
particular, followed by a rebound in investment and to a lower extent in output. On the contrary, Chile
and Colombia (Figure 3) suffer much more both on impact and in the recovery phase since there is
almost no subsequent rebound. The difference between the two groups is not much due to the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution, which is lower than 0.16 for all five countries, i.e., very small value
compared to the critical unity driving the sign of the responses. However, it is due to the significant
different levels of price stickiness. Indeed, the first group of countries have a mean frequency of
price change from 1.5 to 1.7 month—corresponding to a monthly Calvo probability between 0.3 and
0.4—whereas it is 3.1 to 3.3 months for the second group. 7 As to conclude, everything else equal,
increases in (disaster) risk have less impact on macroeconomic quantities in emerging economies
where prices are relatively more volatile.
6 Argentina’s estimate from Havranek et al. (2015) is negative and therefore here replaced by an arbitrarily small but positive
value, such that the model runs consistently.
7 As for comparison, prices change every 7.5 months on average in the US.
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Figure 2. Effect of a 1% increase in the probability of disaster in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.
Calibration: see Table 1. Percentages on the vertical axis.
Figure 3. Effect of a 1% increase in the probability of disaster in Chile and Colombia. Calibration:
see Table 1. Percentages on the vertical axis.
4.3. Response to a Disaster Risk Shock: Country-Specific Disaster Size and Probability
Figures 4 and 5 report the responses to the same shock when not only the EIS and Calvo probability
are country specific, but also the disaster size and probability. This exacerbates substantially the
differences between countries within each of the subgroups. In the first group (Figure 4), Argentina’s
output response is now about four times larger than Mexico’s while Brazil is very mild. The relative
size somehow depends on the type of natural disasters that a country experiences. In particular,
Argentina’s most destructing disasters have been floods, whereas Brazil’s are droughts and Mexico’s
are storms and earthquakes (see Table A1). Nevertheless, the size of the macroeconomic responses to a
disaster risk shock remain small as a whole, in accordance with the price volatility result emphasized
earlier. In the second group (Figure 5), Chile’s responses become much bigger than Colombia’s for the
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same size of the shock. In particular, an increase in the probability of disaster by 1% in Chile generates
a drop in output and labor by more than 2% and a drop in investment close to 6%. These large
magnitudes may be explained by several factors. One is the degree of price stickiness, as already
mentioned. Another is the type of disasters again, in particular Chile experiences major earthquakes
much more than the other countries. Finally, other reasons such as the geographic specificities likely
matter. For instance, the concentration of productive activities in narrower geographic areas may
explain larger damages as a natural catastrophe arrives.
Figure 4. Effect of a 1% increase in the probability of disaster in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico,
with varying steady-state disaster risk and size (see Table A1). Percentages on the vertical axis.
Figure 5. Effect of a 1% increase in the probability of disaster in Chile and Colombia, with varying
steady-state disaster risk and size (see Table A1). Percentages on the vertical axis.
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5. Conclusions
This paper generates theoretical dynamic responses of macroeconomic variables to disaster
risk shocks for five emerging market economies. For this purpose, it builds on the New Keynesian
DSGE model by Isoré and Szczerbowicz (2017) to simulate the effects of changes in the time-varying
probability of disasters, absent of actual disasters. This approach follows the literature on disaster risk
in business cycles, developed by Gabaix (2011) and Gourio (2012) in particular.
The five countries of interest do not differ much by their elasticity of intertemporal substitution,
which is commonly low in emerging market economies with incomplete financial markets. However,
they differ significantly by their degree of price stickiness. All five are much more price-flexible than
the US but Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico’s frequency of price changes is almost double as compared
to Colombia and Chile. This output price volatility seems to make the former group of countries
much less vulnerable to changes in disaster risk than the latter. In addition, Chile’s high frequency
and severity of capital destruction in case of natural disasters make it particularly responsive to time
changes in the probability of disasters.
Overall, this paper suggests that analyzing the uncertainty component in natural disasters, as well
as the fluctuations in this uncertainty over time, is key to economic development. Its theoretical model
forms a positive approach in this direction. Yet, this paper does not draw any normative implication
for practical disaster risk management as such. Further research would be needed in this direction.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Top-10 disasters in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. “Damage” in thousands
of current value US dollars, from EM-DAT-database. “Capital Stock” in thousands of 2011 U.S. Dollars,
and deflator index, from FRED-database. The “∆” column is calculated as the ratio of “Damage” over
“Capital stock” times “Deflator”.
Argentina
Type Date Damage Capital Stock Deflator ∆
Flood October 1985 1,300,000 894440000 0.5650 0.002572431
Flood 1 April 2013 1,300,000 2017062625 1.0560 0.000610323
Flood 11 April1998 1,100,000 1206780125 0.7790 0.001170111
Flood 28 April 2003 1,028,210 1282971250 0.8570 0.000935156
Flood May 1983 1,000,000 874513312.5 0.5290 0.002161613
Flood 4 April 2016 1,000,000 na
Flood August 1983 800,000 874513312.5 0.5290 0.00172929
Flood 1 October 2001 750,000 1284127375 0.8270 0.000706232
Flood September 1993 600,000 1009387687.5 0.7140 0.000832521
Flood 23 March 1988 490,000 937870750 0.6120 0.000853693
Average ∆: 0.001285708
Nb. obs. > 0.001 4
Annual prob. 0.0597
Brazil
Type Date Damage Capital Stock Deflator ∆
Drought January 2014 5,000,000 13311434000 1.0750 0.000349411
Drought 1978 2,300,000 3732019500 0.3710 0.001661154
Drought December 2004 1,650,000 8978346000 0.8800 0.000208836
Drought May 2012 1,460,000 12151692000 1.0390 0.000115638
Flood June 1984 1,000,000 5157555500 0.5480 0.000353814
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Flood June 1984 1,000,000 5157555500 0.5480 0.000353814
Flood 2 February 1988 1,000,000 6099374000 0.6120 0.000267894
Flood 11 January 2011 1,000,000 11662182000 1.0210 0.0000839836
Flood 22 November 2008 750,000 9948994000 0.9800 0.00007.6923
Drought November 1985 651,000 5341811500 0.5650 0.000215697
Average ∆: 0.000368717
Nb. obs. > 0.001 1
Annual prob. 0.0149
Chile
Type Date Damage Capital Stock Deflator ∆
Earthquake 27 February 2010 30,000,000 906230500 1.0000 0.033104161
Flood 25 March 2015 1,500,000 na
Earthquake 3 March 1985 1,500,000 203282750 0.5650 0.013059973
Extreme temp. 10 September 2013 1,000,000 1087604125 1.0560 0.000870693
Earthquake 24 January 1939 920,000 na
Wildfire 15 January 2017 870,000 na
Earthquake 16 September 2015 800,000 na
Volcanic activity 24 April 2015 600,000 na
Earthquake 21 May 1960 550,000 57127410.156 0.1730 0.055650882
Earthquake 6 May 1953 500,000 42003230.469 0.1515 0.078573243
Average ∆: 0.03625179
Nb. obs. > 0.001 4
Annual prob. 0.0597
Colombia
Type Date Damage Capital Stock Deflator ∆
Earthquake 25 January 1999 1,857,366 963227750 0.7910 0.002437766
Flood 1 September 2011 1,290,000 1567348875 1.0210 0.000806117
Flood April 2011 1,030,000 1567348875 1.0210 0.000643644
Volcanic activity 13 November 1985 1,000,000 581150875 0.5650 0.003045528
Flood 6 April 2010 1,000,000 1488079250 1,0000 0.000672007
Earthquake 31 March 1983 410,900 538144687.5 0.5290 0.001443382
Flood November 1970 138,800 293590625 0.2250 0.002101187
Insect infestation 17 May 1995 104,000 855184437.5 0.7440 0.000163456
Flood 15 March 2012 62,000 1646414750 1.0390 0.0000362441
Storm 17 October 1988 50,000 658900687.5 0.6120 0.000123993
Average ∆: 0.001147333
Nb. obs. > 0.001 4
Annual prob. 0.0597
Mexico
Type Date Damage Capital Stock Deflator ∆
Storm 19 October 2005 5,000,000 4645159500 0.9090 0.001184147
Storm 13 September 2013 4,200,000 6297161000 1.0560 0.000631598
Earthquake 19 September 1985 4,104,000 2321685000 0.5650 0.00312864
Storm 15 September 2010 3,900,000 5671746000 1.0000 0.000687619
Flood 28 October 2007 3,000,000 5074071000 0.9620 0.000614596
Storm 10 September 2014 2,500,000 6498113500 1.0750 0.000357886
Storm 1 October 2005 2,500,000 4645159500 0.9090 0.000592073
Storm 30 June 2010 2,000,000 5671746000 1.0000 0.000352625
Storm 22 June 1993 1,670,000 2988199500 0.7140 0.000782724
Storm 12 September 2013 1,500,000 6297161000 1.0560 0.000225571
Average ∆: 0.000855748
Nb. obs. > 0.001 2
Annual prob. 0.0299
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